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NRI legal services - https://lexlords.com/articles/ - http://lexlords.org - http://lexlords.org . 27 of the Evidence Act and may have to be reviewed on a future occasion. It is, therefore, clear that the executive limb of the State cannot' exercise this power on its own authority and without the sanction of law. This answer of the Court makes it clear that the Court fully recognised that the section, by itself and on its true interpretation, sanctioned an indefinite detention but held that that con- tingency had been averted by the fact that the Act itself was of a limited duration. Additionally, in those cases where total turnover of a registered dealer in an year is not less than the turnover specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 10, such a dealer is liable to pay tax at the rate specified in Section 6-B of the Karnataka Act. 989-990, article 31 (2) has imposed three conditions on the exercise of the NRI Legal Services - https://lexlords.com/transfer-of-property/ State's power of eminent domain over private property and those limitations constitute the protection granted tO the owner of the property as his fundamental right. The taking of possession or acquisition must be for a public purpose which implies that this power cannot be exercised except for implementing a public NRI Legal Services - https://lexlords.com/section-498-a-and-related-legal-issues/ purpose. 18(a) of the Specific Relief Act applied to the case as when the Government entered into the contract to grant lease to L in 1934 it had an imperfect title, and it could not grant the fresh lease to anyone during the existence of previous lease in favour of K, but after 31st March, 1948, when the lease in favour of K had expired, the impediment in the way of the Government to grant leases of property was removed and L's right to get the leases had revived. in the (1) [1951] INSC 31; [1951] S. It is said that the section should be construed irrespective of whether it occurs in a temporary statute or a permanent one, and it is urged that if the statute were a permanent one the section, on the aforesaid interpretation, would have permitted an indefinite detention. , aS he then was, expressed himself as follows in connection with the present section 11 (1):- "The objection to the validity of section 11 (1) can be disposed of in a few words. It cannot be exercised for a private purpose. (b) Any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such Court and when no court is so mentioned, may be tried by- (i) The High Court, or (ii) Any other court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable. But, if as already observed, the new Act is to be in force only up to 1st April, 1982, and no deten- tion under the Act can continue thereafter, the discretion- ary power could be exercised only subject to that over-all limit. Having dealt with the correlation between clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 as I apprehend it and having considered and rejected the objections to the conclusions I have arrived at, I proceed now to examine and analyse the provisions of clause (2). Parameshwara Reddy, father-in-law of Mr. The answer is given by Mahajan J. Gali Janardhana Reddy. Finally, the law authorising the taking of possession or acquisition of the property must provide for compensation. " Two points clearly emerge out of these observations as I comprehend them. 27 of the Evidence Act having been made by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise, some of the decided cases have gone further than is warranted by the language of sec. What is a public purpose has been elaborately dealt with in that case and need not be discussed over again here. of the period had already expired relief could only be granted under s. 15 of the Specific Relief Act and in compliance with its conditions; It was therefore entitled to sue for a, specific performance but as a substantial portion. It insists that this sovereign power may be exercised only if it is authorised by a law. In the second place, this argument was met by the Court, not by NRI Legal Services - https://lexlords.com/divorce/ saying that that was not the correct meaning of the section and that on the contrary the words "such period" necessitated the fixation of a definite period of detention but, by saying that the life of the Act being limited, the duration of detention permitted by the section was in any event co-terminous with the life of the Act and could not go beyond it. on October 24, 2002, Smt. As I explained in my judgment in the Darbhanga case (supra) at pp. With regard to the rule applicable to cases where there is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic statements of the nature referred to in sec. Akula Lakshmamma and her family members also entered into an agreement for sale with accused No. The very argument as to the invalidity of the section could not be raised at all except on the basis that the section, by itself and on a true interpretation of it, permitted an indefinite detention. The State of Madras(1) Sastri J. The argument is that the dis- cretionary power given to the appropriate Government under that sub-section to continue the detention "for such period as it thinks fit" authorises preventive detention for an indefinite period, which is contrary to the provisions of article 29.